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SECURITIES REGULATION IN MALAYSIA: EMERGING NORMS OF
GOVERNMENTAL REGULATION
Philip N. PILLAI *
The author examines the emergence of an alternative model of capital market regulation i,
developing countries. He argues that Western models, such as those in the U.S. and Great Britain.
cannot be transferred outright to developing countries without considering factors that are unique to
securities regulation m those countries. As an example of the approach used in one developing nation.
the author examines the Malaysian nodel, which has emerged after man., attempts to utilize and
modify the British model of self-regulation.
1. Introduction
This article examines the emergence of an alternative model of capital
market regulation in developing countries. Until now the options available to
developing countries have been adaptations of (1) the British model of self-reg-
ulation or (2) the U.S. model of the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC). The central thesis of this article is that developing countries usually lack
the structural underpinnings of Western capital markets and that to focus only
on adapting these Western models, without more, is to invite unanticipated
atrophy or mutation of such models. The Western models are premised on the
existence of a well-developed regulatory capacity and sufficient numbers of
professionals and paraprofessionals in the public and private sectors, condi-
tions lacking in most developing countries.
The alternative model examined here is that of Malaysia. The Malaysian
model has developed after many attempts to utilize the British model of
self-regulation. Modification of the British model to provide for government
intervention followed a dramatic collapse of stock market prices in 1982 [1],
coinciding with global recession and a dampening of the general investment
climate. These events were accompanied by allegations that the price collapse
resulted from short-selling and other manipulative activities of organized
groups and from the failure or inability of the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange
to adequately regulate the investment business. What has emerged from this
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experience is a system of securities regulation which, while modeled on British
antecedents, is a mixture of operational autonomy and significant governmen-
tal regulation with reserve interventionary powers for the government.
This article begins with an overview of the British and U.S. models. Section
2.3 considers some factors unique to securities regulation in developing coun-
tries. Section 2.4 briefly outlines the Malaysian model. Section 2.5 compares
the Malaysian model with the British and U.S. models. In the latter part of this
article the focus is the Malaysian system itself. Section 3 presents historical and
economic background. Sections 4 and 5 discuss the historical development and
role of the securities market in Malaysia. Section 6 details statutory provisions
for securities regulation in Malaysia. The concluding section places the Malay-
sian model of securities regulation in comparative perspective.
2. Choice of Models: Self-regulation and Governmental Regulation
When systems of securities regulation are designed for developing countries,
the purposes of a capital market in a developing, as opposed to a developed,
country seldom are considered. Not unnaturally, models of markets in devel-
oped countries are studied and modified for transplantation [2]. Two para-
digms are routinely adapted for use in developing countries. The first, the
British model, is self-regulation of "the City" (the financial community of the
City of London) against a backdrop of usual investor protection legislation.
The other model, that of the United States, is governmental regulation through
the SEC [3].
2.1. The British Model
The British self-regulatory model depends upon the City. This community
comprises the collective financial community of London, including the Bank of
England, the Department of Trade and Industry, the Council for the Securities
Industry, and the various associations of issuing houses, acceptance houses,
merchant banks, the Stock Exchange, insurance companies, unit trust managers,
investment trust companies, and others [4]. The City's financial capabilities are
combined with the well-organized legal, banking, and accounting services of
London itself. This less formal system of self-regulation, the product of the
growth of the financial community over three hundred years of national and
colonial development, has the advantages of flexibility, expertise, and low
operating costs.
Comprehensive national investor protection legislation and companies legis-
lation - the Companies Acts [5], the Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act [6],
and the Licensed Dealers Act (Conduct of Business Rules) [7] - provide the
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historical backdrop to the development of the British model. The interaction of
the City with this legislation is responsible for the unique character of the
British capital market. This model is currently under severe structural criticism,
as evidenced by the Gower Review of Investor Protection [8]. The criticisms
stem from the confusing myriad of self-regulatory agencies in various sectors,
gaps in the scheme of regulation, and ineffective enforcement machinery [9].
The institutional framework and capacity of the City of London is itself well
established. An international community of bankers, lawyers, accountants, and
paraprofessionals developed during the years of British colonial power and has
been enhanced in contemporary London by the universities, polytechnics, and
professional institutes which today draw upon a pool enriched by the "brain
drain" of developing countries.
2.2. The U.S. Model
Under the U.S. model, governmental regulation of the securities markets.
the SEC is charged with investor protection through approval of prospectuses.
close market surveillance, and enforcement of the securities laws on a national
scale. The SEC has quasi-judicial, regulatory, rule-making, and investigatory
powers in securities regulation. The U.S. model does not entail governmental
control of the day-to-day operations of the stock exchanges. Control of daily
operations is left to market professionals.
Like the British model, the U.S. model derives from historical factors
peculiar to that country: the Great Crash of 1929 when the stock market
collapsed, and federal-state relations. First, the experience of financial institu-
tions in the United States after the 1929 Crash resulted in two seminal pieces
of federal legislation: the Securities Act of 1933 [10] and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 [11]. The 1933 Act concerned the initial interstate
distribution of securities and the 1934 Act created the Securities and Exchange
Commission and invested it with power to administer both Acts, including the
major provisions on securities frauds. The 1934 Act also required registration
of brokers and dealers and extended the disclosure requirements of the 1933
Act to the secondary distribution of securities [12]. Second, federal-state
relations have been" an important factor in the development of the U.S. model.
The United States has never had a federal company law; regulation of
companies is a state matter. Also, the only securities legislation in existence
prior to the 1933 and 1934 Acts was the complex of each state's "Blue Sky"
laws, general provisions regulating all aspects of securities, which remain in
effect today [13]. The efficacy of the U.S. model of securities regulation is. in
part, the result of administrative capability. At present, the SEC has a staff of
about 2000 professional personnel. The capabilities of private professionals are
also vital for the U.S. model. That model to a large extent depends upon legal.
accounting, banking and securities professionals and paraprofessionals in the
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
P.N. Pillai / Securities Regulation in Malaysia
private sector. These private-sector participants are located primarily, but not
exclusively, in New York and in Washington, D.C. The U.S. model has been
promoted by an activist judiciary, a widespread taste for litigation, and the
availability of contingency-basis representation and class action suits. The
absence of contingency suits in most British common law jurisdictions [14] and
the nascent development of class actions there [15] may render the U.S. model
sui generis. Both the British and U.S. models, however, have features for
investor protection and indicate in their design a preoccupation with the
secondary trading market rather than the primary market for new issues of
capital-raising securities. And in both countries, the pre-screening of prospec-
tuses is dependent up on both private and public lawyers and accountants.
2.3. Developing Countries and New Capital Markets
When faced with the task of creating a securities market, developing
countries have employed these paradigms [16] with little regard to the objects
and preconditions of a working capital market. The objects of a working
capital market are self-evident. A capital market provides a mechanism which
allows capital to be mobilized for productive investments. Such a market
displaces the unproductive hoarding of gold, cash, and other resources. Devel-
oping countries usually lack domestic savings and capital formation and rely
upon foreign investment and loans from banks. In theory, the market also
diverts capital from inefficient enterprises to efficient enterprises. If these
functions are the primary reasons for establishing and maintaining capital
markets in developing countries, what state resources need to be diverted to the
secondary market and its regulation? What impact, if any, do highly volatile
market prices, sharp practices in market manipulation, and insider trading in
the secondary market have on the primary market and its capacity to mobilize
capital [171?
In considering the preconditions of a working capital market, it must be
reiterated that developing countries have a shortage of professionals in both
the private and public sectors. This lack of institutional capacity is a critical
constraint on the tasks of government in general, and on regulation of the
capital markets in particular. A capital market is not created and sustained
merely by passing the necessary laws [181. It is contingent upon the expertise of
securities, banking, legal, and accounting professionals and paraprofessionals
and competent regulators. A governmental framework for regulation depends,
in part, upon private-sector expertise, as well as its own technical competence
to administer and regulate a securities market. Company law that requires
registration and maintenance of records is premised on a paraprofessional
capacity for these ta~ks. While adequate in Anglo-U.S. markets, this in-
frastructure is wanting in most developing countries. The administrative in-
frastructure in most developing countries is that which exists in what Gunnar
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Myrdal calls a "soft state" characterized by:
a general lack of social discipline ... signified by many weaknesses: deficiencies in
... legislation and in particular, in law observance and enforcement, lack of
obedience to rules and directives handed down to public officials on various levels:
frequent collusion of these officials with powerful persons or groups of persons
whose conduct they should regulate: and, at bottom, a general inclination of people
in all strata to resist public controls and their implementation. Also within the
concept of the soft state is corruption... 119].
2.4. The Malaysian Model
While a detailed picture will be presented below, a broad outline of the
structure of the Malaysian securities market will aid comparison with the two
Western models. The market developed privately, and significant governmental
intervention was not present until 1973. Under the current system of securities
regulation, the primary government actors in the market are the Finance
Minister and Registrar of Companies, with supervisory responsibilities and
reserve interventionary powers. A Capital Issues Committee, with both public
and private representatives, reviews prospectuses. The Committee of the Stock
Exchange, a five-member governing committee, has primary responsibility for
day-to-day supervision of the activities of the Exchange. The membership of
the Committee of the Stock Exchange is mostly private, but the Finance
Minister can appoint government representatives to this Committee.
2.5. Developed and Developing Market Models: A Comparative Overview
It is helpful to identify the various levels of activity in a securities market
and the key agencies involved in each sector. A comparison of the three models
clearly reveals the paths of divergence (table 1).
All three models incorporate disclosure requirements and investor protec-
tion legislation. While the form of such legislative intervention is similar.
practice indicates that the SEC is the most effective enforcement body. In the
area of day-to-day market operations, operational autonomy is common to all
forms: governmental intervention and an overlay of bureaucratic procedures
would operate as a stranglehold on the market and indeed is the very antithesis
of a market.Such operations are best left to market professionals.
Divergences appear in the way that securities exchanges are set up and
governed. The British model of self-regulation allows the Exchange, more or
less, to regulate itself, except that broker-dealers must be licensed under the
Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act [20]. The U.S. model requires similar
licensing of broker-dealers, as well as registration of exchanges and oversight
of their rules. The regulatory nature of that model is most apparent in the
formidable market surveillance powers of the SEC. The Malaysian model
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deviates from the British norm by imposing a licensing structure on exchanges
as well as broker-dealers and their representatives. The Malaysian model also
provides power for the Minister of Finance to appoint members to the
governing committee of an exchange, and ministerial power to approve alter-
ation of rules. Surveillance of the trading floor is the responsibility of the
exchange and the Registrar of Companies, who has administrative control over
securities as well as companies regulation.
In the area of conduct of the securities business, the three models are similar
except that the Malaysian model uses legislation with criminal and delicensing
sanctions to effect its norms of accounting and financial accountability to
clients.
The above representation of the critical features of each regulatory model
reveals that the concept of self-regulation is imprecise and should be either
defined or abandoned. Self-regulation does not mean, under any regulatory
scheme, an absence of statutory control. On the one hand, if self-regulation is
defined as total autonomy on the historical model of the London Stock
Exchange, then it does not exist today. On the other hand, even the U.S. model
of governmental regulation may be characterized as self-regulation with an
overlay of governmental regulation. Professor Louis Loss has described
governmental regulation as cooperative regulation: "The task will be largely
performed by representative organizations of investment bankers, dealers and
brokers, with the Government exercising appropriate supervision in the public
interest, and exercising supplementary powers of direct regulation" [21].
What appears to be a common emphasis is the nature of self-regulation and
government supervision. Where the market is sufficiently developed and under-
takes all operational and regulatory tasks itself, as in Britain and the United
States, day-to-day autonomy may be present. But where, as in most developing
countries, self-regulation by market professionals is weak because of infrastruc-
ture incapacity [22], then government intervention and the availability of
reserve powers to compel market discipline constitute a viable alternative.
Several reasons explain the shortcomings of self-regulation in developing
countries: market professionals do not discipline themselves because they are
reluctant to punish peers; they have inadequate staff and investigatory re-
sources; and they are myopic in not perceiving the wider public interest or the
wider impact of that may appear normal business practices [23].
No matter which model is adopted by a developing country, modifications
become necessary as a result of each country's experience, and structural
divergences from the chosen paradigm are unavoidable. What is common to
such divergences in the developing countries is the absence of institutions
styled upon the SEC. The SEC model involves high direct administrative costs
and professional capabilities beyond those available in developing countries.
Even where the elaborate U.S. model has been adopted, as in Japan [24],
compared to the U.S. experience, securities regulation has undergone a peculiar
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transformation [25]. Private civil actions are rare and, instead of actions by the
agency, the unique Japanese phenomenon of administrative guidance has
emerged as a major device of securities regulation. Intervention appears by
way of governmental representation on stock exchange committees, controls
over rules and licensing procedures, residual investigatory powers, and the
co-opting of the judicial process. The Japanese experience is not surprising
because in many developing countries the state has emerged as the only
domestic organization that can marshall the resources of capital and trained
individuals for economic activity [26]. In like manner, the government rather
than an SEC-type body becomes the only agency of regulation available, even
where it avoids direct intervention.
The Malaysian choice of an intermediate model which combines govern-
ment representation and reserve powers enables the state to generate the
desired regulation, and if such regulation fails, the reserve power of interven-
tion may be invoked. Such a system does not require public investment in a
regulatory system and enables the state to use state enterprise officials and
other private-sector personnel as government watchdogs to ensure some degree
of self-regulation. While the SEC model is not interventionist on its face, it is
quite interventionist in practice. In part, this is the result of its institutional
capacity and its ability to rely on private lawyers and accountants who
participate in securities regulation. By contrast, a highly interventionist legisla-
tive model is present in India [27]; but the reality in India indicates an inability
to change the quality of performance of the key actors. The intermediate
Malaysian model avoids the other alternative - depending upon private sector
self-regulation, because self-discipline is unavailable.
3. The Malaysian Political and Economic Context
The population of Malaysia is 14.26 million with an ethnic distribution of
over half Malay, about 35% Chinese and 10% Indian [281. British colonial
policy in Malaysia was designed to preserve political and administrative power
in the hands of the Malays while allowing the Chinese to maintain control of
the local non-plantation economy [29]. When they departed in 1957, the British
left behind well-organized national and state bureaucracies and transportation
and communication networks, all of which were necessary to the trade patterns
between Malaysia and Britain [30].
The Malaysian economy has historically relied on tin mining and plantation
production of rubber and palm oil. Malaysia is a major world supplier of these
commodities. Since 1957, the Malaysian economy has developed in the areas of
petroleum resources and industrial products. The gross national product per
capital is U.S. $1258.21, and the fixed capital formation per capita is U.S.
$314.40 [31]. The colonial economy of Malaysia was dominated by British
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companies listed on the London Stock Exchange, whose plantation, mining,
and import-export activities were centered in Malaysia and Singapore. In
1969, a series of race riots showed Malay dissatisfaction with the high degree of
native poverty and low degree of native ownership of business and industry
[32]. This resulted in the formulation of the New Economic Policy designed to
redistribute ownership and control of the Malaysian economy to achieve "[t]ihe
ownership and management by Malays and other indigenous people of at least
30% of commercial and industrial activities in the economy and an employ-
ment structure at all levels of operation and management that reflects the
racial composition of the nation by 1990" [33]. This is to be achieved in part by
quotas and preferences for Malays in education, jobs. and share ownership. In
addition, state enterprise is supposed to undertake significant economic activ-
ity which ultimately would be transferred to private hands in a manner that
would satisfy the redistribution formula [34]. In the meantime, some ownership
for lower-income Malays is to be achieved through a unit trust scheme.
Activism on the part of the government in securities regulation should be
understood within the context of the New Economic Policy. The existing
administrative infrastructure is being extended through state enterprise in
terms of both human and financial resource needs. The Malaysian economy,
though severely affected by the global recession and the drop in commodity
prices, has been able to meet these needs, sustaining annual growth rates of
9.2% in 1979, 7.8% in 1980, 6.9% in 1981, and 3.9% in 1982 [35].
Conditions are ripe for corruption and abuse of power where economic
expertise is in the hands of foreigners and local Chinese, and where administra-
tive power, government contracts, licenses, and concessions are in political
hands. While corruption is not as common in Malaysia as in most other
developing countries, it surfaced publicly under the new political leadership of
former Prime Minister Hussein Onn and the current Prime Minister, Dr.
Mahatir. The leadership was undertaken measures to investigate corrupt civil
servants and politicians [36]. The tendency of the Chinese to gamble with stock
investments is well documented in Malaysia as well as in Singapore and Hong
Kong [37]. A Bank Negara (Central Bank) report issued in the first decade of
Malaysian independence noted:
Recent share issues appeared to have encouraged the gambling instincts of certain
sections of the public which apparently were prepared to buy shares, particularly
industrial shares, at excessive prices unwarranted by their prospective yields. This
state of affairs was aided and abetted by the failure of some of the broking firms to
observe the rules of the Malayan Stock Exchange concerning delivery dates [38].
The stage, it seems, is set for tension between the government policies of
economic redistribution and bringing stricter discipline to the financial market,
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and the hitherto acceptable model of self-regulation and laissez-faire business
activity.
4. The Role of the Securities Market
The Malaysian securities market is a significant market which has emerged
and developed through private enterprise, first British and later Chinese, and is
not the result of the government's promotional efforts. This market has only
recently come to occupy public attention because of concern that it is obstruct-
ing governmental policy. In 1983, the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange listed
269 companies with a total market capitalization of M$75.174,363,676 and
showed a turnover for January to October of 1,066,024,000 stocks/shares with
a market value of M$3,252,565,000. Its governing committee of five is com-
prised of a Malay chair and four Chinese members. The Exchange's
broker-dealer membership includes 108 individuals of whom 23 are Malay
[39]. These characteristics indicate that the exchange is still controlled by the
Chinese community, although the number of Malay stockbrokers has increased
in accordance with governmental policy.
Malaysian development planning hitherto has not focused on harnessing the
stock exchange for development goals. Rather, the market has been used as an
incident of capital activity. Thus, mobilization of domestic capital for develop-
ment has relied on social security contributions by way of the Employee's
Provident Fund, the post office savings banks, and similar agencies. Direct
foreign investment, internal capital reserves, and international and domestic
bank lending have supplied capital for industry [40]. Nevertheless, the securi-
ties market has played an important role in raising domestic capital, particu-
larly in new issues [41].
5. The Legislative and Institutional Framework of the Securities Market
The securities markets of Malaysia and Singapore are closely related and the
regulation of one market has important implications for the regulation of the
other. An abbreviated history identifies and explains the ongoing relations of
the two. Although there were antecedents, the beginnings of a Malayan stock
exchange can be traced to the creation of a clearing house and the onset of
continuous trading in 1960 [42]. The clearing house was a joint body serving
both Singapore and Malay with trading rooms in Singapore and in Kuala
Lumpur. With the formation of the Federation of Malaysia in 1963, which
included Singapore, the clearing house was renamed the Stock Exchange of
Malaysia. The name was changed to the Stock Exchange of Malaysia and
Singapore (SEMS) when Singapore withdrew from the Federation in 1965 [43].
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
P.N. Pillai / Securities Regulation in Malaysia
Significantly, the securities market of Malaysia and Singapore predated any
governmental activity either to promote or to regulate it. The market was
created in colonial times and its initial purpose was to deal in securities listed
in London. The market operated to mobilize capital for tin mining, rubber
plantations, agency companies, banking, and other services which facilitated
the colonial pattern of trade between the United Kingdom and Malaya.
In 1969, the government commissioned a report on the Stock Exchange. The
Ferris Report was the blueprint for securities legislation in both Singapore and
Malaysia [44]. The legislation that it envisaged has been succinctly described in
this way:
Both Bills contemplate the continuation of self-regulation in the industry. The SEMS
will continue to exercise wide powers and duties in policing its own affairs under its
own rules and by-laws. It will be responsible for running its day-to-day business and
exert an important front line supervision of the industry. Superimposed over
self-regulation is governmental regulation and it takes the form of ministerial
approval for the establishment of a stock exchange and changes to stock exchange
rules, licensing of various persons in the industry, disclosing of interests, helping of
proper accounts and records, etc., as well as certain substantive prohibitary provi-
sions against forms of malpractices and manipulation in share trading. The bills
when enacted will thus establish a dual regulatory scheme or a two tier system -
with the stock exchange committee playing an important front line duty of self-polic-
ing and the respective governmental bodies exercising overall supervisory admin-
istrative control [45].
The background to Singapore government intervention is explained thus:
Apart from stock exchange scandals, or the fear of them there were more immediate
reasons for the introduction of controls in Singapore. The Government here was
concerned at the ease with which any person, whatever his training or experience or
previous history, could set up business as a dealer in securities or be employed as a
representative and by a member of the Stock Exchange. The Stock Exchange itself.
as a body, at that time, was not as effective as it might have been. These factors as
well as the collapse of two quoted companied and the need to improve Singapore's
image as a financial centre, made the introduction of certain forms of control
inevitable [46].
In electing a model of self-regulation which includes some government
supervision, a critical factor was the acute shortage of expertise and resources
to effectively administer and control the market [47].
In 1973, at the initiative of the Malaysian government, the Exchange was
split into two separate and independent exchanges: the Kuala Lumpur Stock
Exchange and the Stock Exchange of Singapore. While the two exchanges are
organized separately and are governed by distinct systems of securities regu-
lation, several factors continue to dictate a close relationship not found among
other stock exchanges. Most companies listed on one exchange are listed on
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the other. The close, direct-line communication between the securities industry
of the two countries allows for easy purchase and sale of securities through
either or both exchanges. It is not uncommon for shares acquired on one
exchange to be sold through the other exchange to avoid publicity or currency
controls or to take advantage of the relative strength or weakness of the
Singapore dollar and the Malaysian ringgit [48]. Thus, while the two govern-
ments may have differing economic policies and strategies, the mutual impact
of such regulation makes a strong case for a common core of securities
regulation:
As long as both markets lack depth. and are dependent on cross-listing, close
cooperation and a common securities law regime are necessary. Differing governm-
net policies of both countries have an impact on the enforcement of securities
regulation. The complexities this divergence generates is indicated by considering the
difficulties of monitoring and regulating market manipulation activity which
originates in one country and the impact of which is immediately felt in the other.
The regulators of each market are dependent on the other to investigate and bring to
task the violators in each case, but differing policy and administrative manpower
may dictate otherwise 1491.
Securities regulation in Malaysia may be summarized by reference to the
legislative and the institutional systems prescribed by the Companies Act 150],
the Securities Industry Act of 1983 [51], and the Kuala Lumpur Stock
Exchange Listing Manual, Memorandum and Articles of Association, Rules
Relating to Member Firms and Member Companies, and Rules for Trading by
Member Firms and Member Companies. The Companies Act and the Securi-
ties Industry Act are administered by the Registrar of Companies. While
Malaysia currently does not have a code on takeover and mergers [52], it has
Guidelines for the Regulation of Acquisitions, Mergers and Takeovers, which
are administered by the Foreign Investment Committee. The Foreign Invest-
ment Committee is organized within the Economic Planning Unit of the Prime
Minister's Department. The Guidelines relate to acquisition of substantial
fixed assets and acquisition of control or voting rights of Malaysian compa-
nies. The objective is to obtain prior approval of such acquisitions and
approval is readily given to proposals that are consistent with the New
Economic Policy, which seeks increased "Bumiputras" (indigenous Malay)
participation.
A Capital Issues Committee was created in 1968, comprising the Governor
of Bank Negara as chair and representatives from the government and private
sector. Its stated function was:
to consider the raft prospectus or announcement of any company intending to make
a new issue or to seek listing on the Exchange so as to ensure that the public is
provided with all the relevant information about the company. The Committee has
also the function of fixing an appropriate date for a proposed issue. It is the chief
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
P.N. Pillai / Securities Regulation in Malaysia
objective of the Committee to ensure a more orderly and sound development of the
stock market [53].
The Securities Industry Act of 1973 [54] was repealed and replaced by the
Securities Industry Act of 1983. However, the core of the regulatory system
introduced by the 1973 legislation was retained in the 1983 Act. In outline, this
core system has several key features. The Minister is empowered to approve
the rules of a stock exchange, as well as the establishment of a new stock
exchange [551. The primary participants in a securities market must be licensed
[56]. Licensing rules govern the granting and renewal of licenses for dealers,
dealers' representatives, investment advisers, and investment representatives
[571.
The primary participants in the securities market are required to maintain
proper records of their dealings in securities and the Registrar may inspect
these records and provide extracts to persons upon payment of a fee [58].
Dealers are required to keep audited accounts and other records which
sufficiently explain the transactions and financial position of their business,
and which facilitate preparation of accurate profit and loss accounts and
balance sheets [59]. They are required to maintain trust accounts for clients'
funds not immediately applied to the purchase of securities [60]. A fidelity
fund has been created by the Stock Exchange to compensate any person who
suffers a pecuniary loss as a result of defalcations by a dealer [61].
6. The Emerging Norms
6.1. The Capital Issues Committee [62]
In its origins, the Capital Issues Committee (CIC) appears to have been
modeled upon the Capital Issues Committee in Britain. The British Committee
was established under the Control of Borrowing Order of 1947 1631, which
made it necessary to obtain Treasury consent to raise funds by the issue of
securities. The purpose of this Committee was to mobilize investment for
national interests in the post-war period. It was not designed for investor
protection [64]. The Malaysian CIC, on the other hand, undertook investor
protection functions with the objective of ensuring "a more orderly and sound
development of the stock market" [65].
Until recently, there were doubts about the legal basis of the powers
exercised by the Capital Issues Committee. A letter to the Kuala Lumpur
Stock Exchange rather than legislation defined the role of the Committee [66].
The Securities Industries Act of 1973 did not authorize the creation of such a
Committee, but merely empowered the Minister to "consult the opinion of a
panel of experts now known as the Capital Issues Committee on matters
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol8/iss1/3
P.N. Pillai / Securities Regulation in Malaysia
relating to the securities industry" [67] and to consult the Registrar for the
proper and effective implementation of the Act [68]. Thus, the legitimacy of
the CIC remained clouded.
The 1983 Act settles the issue. Under that Act, the Minister must establish a
consultative body, known as the Capital Issues Committee, which will advise
him on matters relating to the securities industry. The CIC may, on its own
initiative, advise the Registrar on matters within its purview. In addition, the
Registrar may consult the CIC on matters relating to the proper and effective
implementation of the Act [69].
In addition to legitimizing the CIC, the 1983 Act gives statutory form and
effect to the CIC's role. The Capital Issues Committee has three basic
functions:
(1) to advise the Minister or the Registrar on matters relating to the
securities industry or when the Registrar seeks its views as to the proper and
effective implementation of the Act;
(2) to deal with such other matters as may be assigned in writing to the
Committee by the Minister relating to the securities industry; and
(3) to exercise powers relating to proposals which must be submitted to the
Committee by
(i) all public limited companies incorporated in Malaysia unless the com-
pany falls within any exemption made by order of the Minister in
Gazette, for any
(a) new issues or offers for sale of securities to the public whether such
issues or offers for sale are by way of public issues or by private
placements;
(b) right issues of securities;
(c) bonus issues of securities otherwise than by way of the capitaliza-
tion of unappropriated profits [70];
(d) schemes of arrangements, schemes of reconstruction, takeover
schemes, share option schemes and acquisition of assets by way of
issue of securities; and
(e) listing and quotation of securities on a stock exchange;
(ii) all public limited companies incorporated outside Malaysia which en-
tered to issue or offer for sale securities to the public or to list such
securities on a stock exchange prior to the registration of the relevant
prospectuses with the Registrar; and
(iii) all public limited companies incorporated outside Malaysia which are
already listed on a stock exchange, for the listing and quotation of any
additional securities.
The Committee must examine these proposals with reference to: the viabil-
ity of the company, the quality and capability of the management of the
company, the suitability for listing of the company in a stock exchange where
applicable, and the interest of the public. It may approve the proposals upon
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such items and conditions as it deems fit. A decision of the CIC may be
appealed to the Minister.
The role of the CIC as defined by statute does not differ substantially from
that under the previous informal system. The significance of having statutory
specification rather than informal guidelines is indicated by Wan Hamzah J.,
who considered the effects of the Guidelines for the Regulation of Acquisition
of Assets, Mergers and Take-overs:
The guidelines were issued not pursuant to any power given by law, and in my
opinion they have no force of law but are of advisory character merely. I do not
think that noncompliance with the guidelines can be taken as an act opposed to
public policy. The guidelines reflect the Government's political philosophy, but the
Government's political policy is not public policy [71].
The 1983 Act does change the informal scheme in several important ways.
There is now a statutory right of appeal to the Minister, whose decision is final.
Also, the governing considerations of the CIC in approving proposals are now
stipulated. The "finality clause" has the effect of precluding appeals to a court
of law. It does not bar judicial review [72] on the usual broad grounds of
jurisdiction and natural justice. The jurisdictional bases for judicial review
include breaching the rules of natural justice, applying a wrong legal test,
answering the wrong question, and failing to take relevant considerations into
account or basing the decision on legally irrelevant considerations [73]. Inter-
esting and difficult questions may be posed as to the definition of public
interest and the extent to which the New Economic Policy can be equated with
public interest, as opposed to political interests.
The statutory scheme expands the role of the Capital Issues Committee. The
Minister must consult the CIC when invoking new powers to appoint govern-
ment representatives to the Committee of the Stock Exchange [74] and to
amend the rules of an approved stock exchange [75]. These two new ministerial
powers make significant inroads into the self-regulation model so beloved by
proponents of the free market [76].
Despite governmental representation on the Committee of the Stock Ex-
change, self-regulation remains a fundamental attribute of the market under a
definition of self-regulation as day-to-day operation and continued autono-
mous administration of the market. The presence of governmental representa-
tion is designed to spur the Committee of the Stock Exchange to exercise its
powers of supervision and surveillance. In the recent past, Committee members
were not only lax in enforcement of stock exchange rules, but in some cases
they allegedly violated such rules [77].
The Minister of Finance recently has exercised the new statutory power to
amend rules of the stock exchange. Briefly, the amendments seek to allow the'
Minister to direct the Committee of the Stock Exchange to appoint as a
member of the exchange any Malay whom the Minister considers suitable to
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be a dealer in securities. Similar amendments would allow the Minister to
approve as a dealer's representative any Malay the Minister considers suitable
to deal in securities. Under the proposed amendments, the maximum number
of seven Committee members would not apply to the Minister's appointees.
Finally, the tenure of the chairman of the Committee would be extended to
three years instead of the current one-year term. In line with this aspiration for
professionalism, the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange has recently appointed an
assistant general manager with previous working experience in the civil service
and Registry of Companies [78].
6.2. The Effect and Enforcement of the Rules of the Stock Exchange
The Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange has four separate constitutional docu-
ments with differing legal effects on members and on non-members. First, the
Exchange is incorporated under the Companies Act and the legal obligations
prescribed by its memorandum and articles of association are couched in
standard company law terms [79]. The second set of documents comprises the
Listing Manual, and its impact on listed companies is the result of a general
undertaking by which the companies agree to abide by the rules of the
exchange. The third set of documents is the Rules Relating to Member Firms
and Member Companies. Every member firm or company signs an agreement
to observe these rules, and breach of the agreement may subject the company
to fine, suspension, or withdrawal of recognition [80]. The fourth set of
documents is the Rules for Trading by Member Firms and Member Compa-
nies. The basis of the binding effect of the Exchange rules on members is not
in doubt. A non-member dealing through a member of the Stock Exchange is
legally bound as well; a non-member implicitly authorizes the member to make
contracts according to the rules and undertakes to indemnify the member
against any liability incurred under these rules. This rule does not apply when
a court finds such rules to be either illegal or unreasonable and not known to
the non-members [81].
Having summarized the usual effects of Stock Exchange rules on members
and non-members, one should note that a common problem encountered in
developing countries is that of translation of law on paper into active regu-
lation and enforcement. Self-regulation requires private enforcement which, as
discussed above, is inadequate in these countries. In Malaysia, the regulatory
powers of the Registrar have been strengthened because of governmental
impatience with the reluctance and inability of the Exchange to keep its house
in order. Two new techniques have been designed to give effect to the rules and
to ensure their enforcement: the first is judicial enforcement of the rules at the
initiative of the Registrar and the second is considerable enhancement of the
administrative and investigative powers of the Registrar. Section 11 of the 1983
Act permits the High Court to compel due compliance and observance of the
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rules or listing requirements of a stock exchange. When any person is under an
obligation to comply with, observe, enforce, or give effect to such rules or
requirements and fails to do so, the Registrar or the exchange may now apply
to the High Court for an order compelling compliance [82]. A company whose
securities are listed on an exchange is deemed to be under an obligation to
comply with the listing requirements [83].
The effect of such rules on members and others obliged to observe them is
now enhanced by court orders. More significantly, this process is available to
compel relevant agencies - the Committee of the Stock Exchange, for example
- to enforce rules that it has failed to enforce in the past [84]. This change is a
response to situations in which member companies operated branches in
various states in breach of existing rules and the Committee was unwilling or
unable to enforce the rules.
What is the effect of a court directive? Section 100 of the Act gives the
Court extensive powers [85]. Where an offense has been (or is about to be)
committed or where there has been a contravention of the conditions of a
license or the rules (listing requirements) of the Stock Exchange, the Registrar
may apply for an order. The Stock Exchange itself may apply for an order
where the rules or listing requirements have been contravened. The High Court
is then empowered to order one or more of the following:
(1) in the case of persistent or continuing breaches, an order restraining a
person from carrying on a business of dealing in securities. acting as an
investment adviser, dealer's representative or investment representative or form
holding himself out as so carrying on business or so acting;
(2) restraining a person from acquiring, disposing of or otherwise dealing
with any specified securities;
(3) appointing a receiver [86] of the property [87] of a dealer or of property
held by him for or on behalf of another person whether; in trust or otherwise;
(4) declaring a contract relating to securities to be void or voidable;
(5) to secure compliance with any order, under this section, to direct a
person to do or refrain from doing a specified act; and
(6) any ancillary order.
A person who fails to comply with a Court order commits an offense
punishable under Section 100(5).
While Section 100 has wider application than Section 11, it encompasses
Section 11 where the preconditions of Section 100 are present, that is, where
the default also constitutes an offense or is a contravention of the conditions of
a license or the rules or listing requirements of the Stock Exchange. It is not
clear whether agencies which may be compelled under Section 11 to enforce
the rules are amenable to the sanctions prescribed in Section 100. Their failure
to enforce the rules does not ipsofacto constitute an offense or a contravention
of the rules or of the listing requirements of the exchange. Therefore, the
powers prescribed in Section 100 would be inappropriate against the Commit-
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol8/iss1/3
P.N. Pillai / Securities Regulation in Malaysia
tee of the Stock Exchange. It would be appropriate to compel the Committee
or its members by the usual powers of contempt of court [88] or to cause
members of the Committee to vacate office for non-compliance.
The administration of the Act is undertaken by the Registrar of Companies.
The investigatory powers of the Registrar have been enhanced considerably in
an attempt to remedy an inability to obtain information and to compel
performance of duties by other bodies [89]. Section 10 of the new Act obliges
the Stock Exchange to provide such assistance to the Registrar as reasonably
required for the performance of functions and duties. The Exchange now is
required to notify the Registrar of any disciplinary action against a member
within seven days of that action, specifying the identity of the member, reason
and nature of the action, and the sanction imposed [90]. Under subsection
10(3), the Registrar has a statutory right of full and free access to the trading
floor of any stock market. Under subsection 10(4), any obstruction or hindrance
of the Registrar's right of floor access is a punishable offense [911. Subsections
10(3) and 10(4) are intended to permit market surveillance during critical
periods. However, it may become necessary for the Registrar to appoint a
representative to monitor the floor on a more continuous basis. The presence
of an informed officer may add another dimension to the surveillance role [92].
When a person has refused or failed to comply with an inspector's investiga-
tion by providing information concerning a questionable securities transaction,
the Minister may issue any of several orders. The Minister may issue an order
restraining such a person or brokerage house from disposing, acquiring or
exercising any right attached to specified securities. The Minister may order
the registered holder of securities to give notice of such an order to any person
whom the holder knows is entitled to exercise a right to vote attached to those
securities [93]. The Minister may order a third party not to pay any sum due in
respect of such securities, except in the course of winding up. The Minister
may also order a third party not to issue shares or register the transfer or
transmission of securities to such non-complying recalcitrants [941.
Section 98 of the new Act empowers the Registrar to order a dealer to
disclose the identity of all partners to a transaction and the nature of nature of
any instructions given in relation to an acquisition or disposal of securities [95].
The Registrar also "may require any person who has acquired or disposed of
secuities to disclose whether that was done as trustee or on behalf of another
person and the nature of any instructions given [96]. Additionally, a stock
exchange may be ordered to disclose the names of members of the exchange
who participated in an acquisition or disposal of securities [97].
The Registrar may initiate investigations on his own initiative when there is
reason to suspect a violation of the Act [98]. The Registrar now has the power
to compound a person's offenses [99] and to institute criminal proceedings
[100].
The Minister may initiate an investigation when the national or public
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interest so dictates. The Registrar is then directed to arrange for the investiga-
tion into the questionable securities transactions [101]. The powers of the
Registrar/Inspector are extensive and include the powers to require a person:
(a) to produce books under his control or custody; (b) to give the Registrar all
reasonable assistance in connection with an investigation; and (c) to appear
before the Registrar for examination under oath. While conducting an ex-
amination, the Registrar may make a written record of the proceedings which,
if authenticated, may serve as prima facie evidence of both the the questions
asked and the answers given [102]. According to Section 107, this evidentiary
record is to accompany the final report of an investigation [103].
The significance of the record as prima facie evidence in criminal or civil
proceedings is apparent when a court makes a determination that: the person
to be examined is dead or is unfit to give evidence as a witness; the person to
be examined is not in Malaysia and it is not reasonably practicable to secure
attendance; the person to be examined cannot be found despite reasonable
steps taken; considering the time lapse and other circumstances, the person
examined cannot reasonably be expected to recollect the matter; or in all the
circumstances, undue delay or expense would be caused by calling the person
as a witness.
The court establishes the weight of such evidence with due regard to all
circumstances from which an inference can be reasonably drawn as to the
accuracy of the evidence. Such circumstances, however, exclude the date of the
examination and the presence or absence of any incentive for concealment or
misrepresentation [104].
When contrasted with the Companies Act [105], the evidence-gathering
provisions of the Securities Industry Act appear quite novel. Generally, corpo-
rate investigations are administrative in nature, not judicial or quasi-judicial.
The report of the appointed inspector is an expression of the inspector's
findings and opinions and not a legal decision binding on all persons [106].
Criminal and civil proceedings may be initiated subsequent to corporate
investigations [1071 but these are de novo proceedings [108]. Unlike the written
record of the examination conducted by the Registrar under the Securities
Industry Act, the report of the corporate inspector is not accorded independent
evidentiary weight.
6.3. Conduct of Securities Business
The new Act also encourages market discipline and professionalism through
changes in the substantive rules of trading. These changes are designed to
protect investors who do business with broker-dealers by augmenting basic
disclosure controls surrounding contract notes, brokers acting as principals.
dealers' interests in securities, dealers executing clients' orders, and transac-
tions through dealers' employees.
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The new Act contains general provisions designed to regulate the conduct of
the securities business. Some of these provisions amplify the underlying
fiduciary relationship between dealers [109] and their clients and mandate
specific types of disclosure. The first Malaysian innovation is the statutory
requirement that dealers issue contract notes to their clients [1101. According
to subsection 38(2), a contract note should include: the name and address of
the dealer; if acting as a principal, a statement to that effect; details of the
date, number, amount, price, commission, terms of delivery, and stamp duty
and taxes payable; and details of any amount added or deducted from the
settlement amount [111]. Significantly. a dealer is enjoined from including in a
contract note the name of the person with or for whom he has entered into the
transaction if it is known or could reasonably be expected to be known that the
name is not the same by which that person is ordinarily known [112].
A dealer doing business with a non-dealer client is obliged to inform the
client when he is acting as a principal and not as an agent. This common law
fiduciary principle has been explained in this way:
The broker who is employed to buy shares cannot sell his own shares unless he
makes a full and accurate disclosure of the fact to his principal and the principal.
with a full knowledge, gives his assent to the changed position of the broker. The
prohibition of the law is absolute. It will not allow an agent to place himself in a
situation which, under ordinary circumstances, would tempt a man to do that which
is not best for his principal. The Court will not enter into discussion as to the
propriety of the price charged by the broker, nor is it material to enquire whether the
principal has or has not suffered a loss. If the breach of duty by the broker be
shown, the court will set aside the transaction [113].
The abuse has been long standing in Malaysia, as early case law reveals. In
Fearon & Co. v. H.T. Stivin and G.E. Green [114], the practice of the broker.
unknown to the client, was to quote stock purchase prices which included
overhead expenses and the costs of cabling and rates of exchange, plus
remuneration for the broker. As the Court wrote:
iT~he defendants not only never knev that the price to be paid as the purchase price
was more than the market price but they also never knew they were sometimes
buying plaintiff's own shares and when the time came that the shares were to be sold
against them the communication on the telephone. a mere word "sold" from the
plaintiff.' would lead them to suppose that a genuine sale to an independent
purchaser had gone through [1151.
Section 40 of the new Act restates the prohibition against a broker's acting
as a principal without informing the client and requires a statement of this
disclosure in the contract note [116]. In addition, the broker is prohibited from
charging the non-dealing customer any brokerage commission or fee in respect
of the transaction [117]. The Act extends the broker-acting-as-principal doctrine
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to situations where a dealer acts through or for persons associated with the
dealer or a corporation in which the dealer and his partners or directors
together hold a controlling interest [118]. A breach of the statutory disclosure
requirement allows a purchaser or vendor who has not disposed of the secuities
to rescind the contract within fourteen days of receipt of the contract note
[119]. The common law remedy of recision is also expressly preserved by
subsection 40(8).
The nature of the securities industry in Malaysia and Singapore required
statutory reaffirmation of the existing common law rule of recision. While the
common law rule no doubt exists apart from legislation, its enforcement
through an action is contingent upon detection of the irregularity by an
aggrieved client - an unusual occurrence in active markets, even in the best of
times. Incorporation of the rule into the new statute, linked with the addition
of criminal sanctions, is more likely to generate industry-wide compliance.
When dealers, investment advisers or their representatives send circulars or
written communications to clients in which they make recommendations, they
must include a concise statement disclosing any relevant interest in the
acquisition or disposal of those securities. The statement must be in type no
less legible than that used in the remainder of the communication [120].
Furthermore, such documents must be signed by an appropriate party.
Brokers are now obliged to give priority to their client's orders and are
subject to criminal sanctions for violating this duty. Section 92 of the new Act
prohibits a dealer from entering into a purchase or sale of securities on a stock
market if a client has an outstanding instruction to purchase or sell securities
of the same class. This prohibition seeks to remedy what is locally referred to
as being "jobbed by a dealer": a dealer fills an order at the end of the day at a
price more favorable to the dealer than to the client. This may happen when
the dealer fills an outstanding order after personally taking a security at a
better price. The prohibition of Section 92 does not apply if the client's
instructions impose specified conditions as to the price and the dealer has been
unable to transact because of those conditions [121]. In sum, Section 92
applied when a dealer is given discretion, as for example when instructed to
"deal at best".
Section 92 is a desirable addition to securities regulation in Malaysia, where,
as in Singapore, the practice of being "jobbed by a dealer" is common.
However, the problem of identifying the prices and times of orders and
executions remains. Regulations requiring time and date stamping of orders
and the appropriate identification of execution would strengthen Section 92.
Only then would it be possible to match orders and transactions to detect more
readily if the prohibition has been violated. Additionally, by placing Section 92
within Part IX of this Act, Parliament has created a right to civil compensation
after the conviction of an offender [122].
Dealers, investment advisers, and their employees may not as principals
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jointly purchase or subscribe or agree to purchase or subscribe to any securities
[123]. Credit may not be given by dealers or investment advisers to employees
or persons associated with them for that purpose [124]. An employee of a
member firm or company may only purchase or agree to purchase securities or
rights or interests therein when the member firm or company acts as agent for
the employee in the transaction [125].
These prohibitions address problems which arise when dealer companies
relax credit controls for employee tradings [126]. Such informal credit to
employees affects the liquidity and solvency of the dealer company itself. The
object of Section 93 is to ensure that, in trading for themselves, employees are
placed in a position no different than that of the clients of the dealer company.
By placing Section 93 within part IX of this Act, Parliament has also created a
right to civil compensation after the conviction of an offender [127].
With respect to an underwriting agreement that requires a person to take up
all securities that have not been sold. such a person is barred, for 90 days after
the close of the offer, from making an offer to sell other than in the ordinary
course of trading on a stock market. A recommendation with regard to those
securities may not be made unless the recommendation contains or is accom-
panied by a statement to the effect that the person has acquired or is obliged to
acquire the securities ,under an underwriting agreement because they have not
been fully subscribed or purchased [128]. Such circulars or communications are
to be lodged with the Stock Exchange where the person is a member of the
Exchange or else with the Registrar [129].
6.4. Securities Frauds
Finally, the new Act sets forth a new series of securities fraud provisions
which proscribe short-selling, wash sales, matched orders, market rigging.
insider trading, and use of false or misleading statements. The Australian
Securities Industry Act 1980 served as a model for this part of the Act [130].
Short-selling is a device by which a speculator sells securities or commod-
ities which he does not own, expecting that prices will fall to such an extent
that he is able to cover himself or make delivery by buying at a lower price
[131]. The practice is common to most securities and commodities markets.
Often it is used as a device to manipulate the market. The proponents of
short-selling argue that it is a useful and necessary device for maintaining an
orderly market and that it functions to cushion the decline of prices. The
practice, impact and abuses of short-selling have been longstanding issues in
Malaysia and Singapore. The use of this device to manipulate the market has
been described in the press in the following way:
The syndicates will recruit the help of delivery clerks, trading assistants and
remisiers of most broking firms. Their intention is to find only one thing - which
counters are "long" (lead buyers to hold the shares for investment) as on what
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scrips that are placed with brokers for sale in large numbers by institutions or larger
shareholders.
The syndicates will then dive in for the kill, that is sell the shares downwards
mercilessly. Then they will approach the brokers for a direct sale of the shares they
have sold short the previous day. The brokers will only be too happy to sell. The
shares are then distributed to the public who panic because of the falling values. The
game is played on and on until there is no confidence at all in the shares [132].
Historically, the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange and the Stock Exchange of
Singapore implemented common measures when short-selling was pinpointed
as the reason for volatility in stock market prices. The exchanges usually
ordered a stricter enforcement of existing rules on script delivery and prompt
clearing of brokers' contracts. The Stock Exchange of Singapore attempted to
diffuse criticism by announcing that it would investigate market trading and
by ordering that all transactions be conducted on an immediate settlement
basis of clearance within twenty-four hours. Brokers were prohibited from
effecting sales when clients could not deliver share certificates within this time.
All member companies were required to submit a list of contracts that were
due and outstanding together" with buying-in notices. The ineffectiveness of
these measures was due in part to the absence of infrastructure capability.
The Malaysian Act now contains a prohibition against short-selling. Section
41 prohibits a person (or that person's agent) from selling securities unless
there is a reasonable belief that a presently exercisable, unconditional right to
vest the securities in the purchaser exists [133]. A "presently exercisable and
unconditional right" covers a person who has such a right at any particular
time or has the right vested in accordance with his instructions. It also
encompasses a right to securities which are charged or pledged in favor of
another person to secure the repayment of money [134]. Sales by a seller who
has previously contracted to purchase securities and has a right to have such
securities vested conditioned only upon payment of the consideration, receipt
of a proper instrument of transfer, and documents of title to the securities, are
excluded from the prohibition against short-selling [135].
A member of a stock exchange who holds a dealer's license and who
specializes in "odd lot" transactions may, for these transactions only, sell short
[136]. "Odd lots" are defined in relation to marketable parcels: they are small
parcels of securities that otherwise would not be traded on the exchange
because they do not amount to a marketable parcel within the meaning of the
rules and listing requirements of that exchange [137].
A significant exemption is given to short sales when arrangements are made
before the sale that will enable delivery of the securities to the purchaser within
three business days after the sale. Persons who are associated with the issuing
company are not exempted because such persons may cover themselves by
causing the company to issue new shares to them. Two further conditions to
this exemption are (1) that the sale is at a price not below that at which an
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immediately preceding ordinary sale was effected, and (2) that it is above the
price of an immediately preceding ordinary sale, unless the latter price was
higher than the next preceding different price of an ordinary sale. The Stock
Exchange is to be immediately informed that the sale has been made short
[138]. Short-sellers are obliged to inform their brokers that the sale is a short
sale [139]; and any document evidencing such sale is to include an endorsed
statement that the sale was a short sale [140]. The Act makes short-selling a
criminal offense. Civil remedies are not provided. The broker, however, has the
usual remedies on non-delivery of securities: institution of buying-in proce-
dures and indemnification by the short-selling client.
This new prohibition has several difficulties. First, the problem of ineffec-
tive enforcement is raised because most of the securities are listed on the Kuala
Lumpur Stock Exchange and the Stock Exchange of Singapore, and some are
additionally listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and the London Stock
Exchange. Although Malaysian clients and brokers may not sell short on the
Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange, problems arise if short-selling is conducted by
Malaysian clients through the Singapore Stock Exchange where short-selling is
not an offense. Similar problems arise when those who are not residents of
Malaysia attempt to sell short through the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange.
Second, arbitrage (which operates when prices for the same security are lower
on one exchange than on the other) [141] between exchanges and short-selling
on arbitrage similarly is prohibited. Arbitrage, however. is economically desira-
ble because it serves to create a parity in prices of securities listed on several
exchanges.
Administration of the short sales law presents considerable problems and it
is difficult to see how evasion of its proscriptions can be entirely prevented.
One might ask whether this is an instance of legislative overkill. Short-selling
has an economic function - it generates a market and, consequently, a certain
volume of trading, which accounts for brokers' fondness for the practice.
Without the new law, the usual market-rigging provisions would apply to short
sales used to manipulate the market, except that problems of proof would be
difficult.
What then are alternative devices of control that might permit the desirable
market-creating effects of short-selling but curb market manipulation? A
common device is disclosure. Dealers and clients could be required to disclose
short sales to opposite parties and to the Stock Exchange. The revealed
information would be compiled and made available to the public at the end of
each trading day or week. This device would fully inform the public about the
occurrence and extent of short sales, enabling traders to avoid the conse-
quences of being caught dangerously short. This device also would allow the
Exchange and the Registrar to detect early signals of potential market manipu-
lation, thereby permitting the effective use of protective measures. Another
device is "designated securities" whereby an Exchange cautions market traders
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that action with respect to a particular security is imminent. Such action may
include the imposition of conditions on dealing, margin requirements, and
immediate delivery conditions. The exchange may also restrict any dealer from
doing business in particular securities or prohibit sales unless certificates are
delivered at the time of the contract [142]. In extreme cases, suspension of the
listing may be ordered [143].
Section 84 of the 1982 Act prohibits wash sales [144] and matched order
transactions [145]. Under Section 84, a person may not create misleading
appearances of extravagant prices or overactive trading in securities on a
Malaysian stock market. Nor may a person maintain, inflate, depress or cause
fluctuations in the market price of the securities by means of a purchase or sale
of securities not involving a change in the beneficial ownership of those
securities, or by any fictitious transactions or devices [146].
Section 85 of the 1982 Act outlaws market-rigging transactions [147]. It
prohibits persons from effecting, taking part in, being concerned in, or
carrying out two or more transactions in securities of a corporation that have
or are likely to have the effect of raising, lowering, maintaining or stabilizing
the price of such securities on a Malaysian stock market with intent to induce
other persons to sell securities of this or related corporations. "Transactions"
include making an offer to sell or purchase securities and an express or implied
invitation to a person to offer to sell or purchase such securities [148].
Section 86 of the new Act adopts a prior prohibition against any person
making a statement or disseminating information that is materially false or
misleading and is likely to induce the sale or purchase of securities by other
persons, or is likely to raise, lower, maintain or stabilize the market price of
securities. The prohibition applies when the person making the statement or
distributing the information does not care whether it is true or false or knows
or reasonably ought to know that it is materially false or misleading.
6.5. Insider Trading
The Securities Industries Act of 1983 includes provisions on insider trading
[1491, adding to measures already prescribed in the Companies Act [150].
Section 89 of the new Act introduces a civil remedy substantially similar to
that adopted in Singapore almost a decade ago [151]. That section extends the
Singapore model in significant ways. "Insiders" include officers, agents, and
employees of a corporation and officers of a Stock Exchange. The latter group
is a new addition to the definition of "insiders". The definition of "agents" is
innovative as well, including accountants, stockbrokers, bankers, and solicitors
who are or at any time in the preceding six months have been knowingly
connected with a corporation and have obtained unpublished price-sensitive
information by virtue of that connection, which they would not disclose except
in the course of proper performance of functions attaching to their positions
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1152]. "Officers" include directors, secretaries, employees, receivers, managers,
and liquidators in a voluntary winding up as well as persons who have held
these positions for the preceding twelve months [153].
A new and highly desirable innovation is the extension of the insider
prohibition to persons holding official positions. The provision covers the
relevant ministers and high civil servants, the Registrar of Companies, the
Registrar of Land Titles, the Tax Department, and officials of various statu-
tory and non-statutory bodies including the Capital Issues Committee and the
Foreign Investment Committee. Such persons are likely to be privy to corpo-
rate information that they may be tempted to exploit during their terms of
office or after retirement. If such information is used while the officials are in
office, the usual public service disciplinary procedures may be invoked. Section
90, however, is an invaluable control device if the information is used after
retirement or resignation.
Such insiders are prohibited from dealing in securities and from making
improper use of specific confidential information acquired by virtue of their
position, which, if generally known, might be expected to affect materially the
price of the securities on a Stock Exchange. Such insiders are also liable to a
person for loss suffered by reason of payment or receipt of consideration that
is greater or less than the consideration that would have been reasonable if the
information had been generally known [154].
The insider trading prohibition extends to information concerning the
possibility of a take-over offer or bid or the making of a substantial commer-
cial transaction by a corporation [155]. An action to recover must be com-
menced within two years of the completed transaction [156] and is not
contingent up on a prior criminal conviction. Damages are calculated as the
price differential between whtft was paid for the securities and what the price
would have been had the information been generally available.
The key ingredient of insider trading is "specific confidential information".
"specific" is defined as information that has an existence of its own and can be
identified and expressed unequivocally [157]. "Information" is knowledge of a
particular event or situation such as advice, communication, intelligence, news.
notification, and the like [158]. "Confidential" information can hardly be
interpreted to include only information actually labelled "confidential". To
apply such a limitation would negate the broad objective of Section 89. Rather,
the term seems to encompass information that is disseminated to insiders to
use for the company's benefit; the information is not intended for general
dissemination. One significant gap in this form of regulation is the omission of
liability for "tippees". Under Section 89, insiders are liable for gains by any
others, including intended "tippees"; but liability of "tippees" themselves for
gains resulting from inside information is not included in the section. This
contrasts with the U.S. Rule 10b-5, which has been included in the Singapore
Securities Industry Act [159].
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7. Conclusion
The review of the emerging Malaysian model reveals two significant devel-
opments. First, from a self-regulatory perspective, the Malaysian government
has introduced a significant number of interventionist and reserve powers into
its securities market, some of which the government has begun to exercise in
order to effect its economic policies. Second, the Malaysian model now
includes a wide range of measures to ensure discipline of and enforce control
over broker-dealers and to protect dealers. The weakness of self-discipline has
justified the wider intervention. The question remains whether the government
will have the capacity to enforce these powers and to induce the market
behavior it desires.
The Indian experience, with a wider range of interventionist powers but a
low capacity to exercise those powers, suggests that more than interventionist
legislation is needed [160]. In the face of this reality, which is common to most
Third World countries, securities regulation should be a cooperative exercise
with the the market itself undertaking the primary burden of responsibility and
the government supervising the market through discretionary power to inter-
vene directly when occasion demands. An alternative, fashioned after the U.S.
model, is to regulate through an increased level of civil liability, supplemented
by a small investigating staff [161). This alternative, however, must acknowl-
edge that the U.S. system depends on a contingency fee system that encourages
private civil actions and on the litigiousness of the people of the United States.
The model now emerging in Malaysia is the result of Malaysia's own set of
circumstances. However, several elements of the Malaysian experience have
wider relevance, particularly to Third World countries. On the one hand, this
experience suggests that the self-regulatory model is not very useful for many
developing countries because it depends on private-sector professionalism. On
the other hand, the U.S. model of government regulation also depends upon
private-sector professionalism and is institutionally expensive at the same time.
The Malaysian system suggests an alternative model premised on govern-
ment intervention and initiative to compel the market to acquire and maintain
some degree of professionalism. This model requires that the government
develop its own administrative and regulatory capability, as well as inspire the
private sector of the capital market to raise its standards of professionalism.
The value of the Malaysian model for other developing countries is two-fold.
For countries that already have securities markets, it suggests a range of
structural measures that may be useful in correcting market imperfections
without the high administrative costs required by prominent Western models.
These measures provide the leverage with which governments may induce the
private securities market to correct abuses and upgrade professional skills. For
countries that do not have viable securities markets and are creating them, the
Malaysian model points out the problems of reliance on the private sector, as
well as reliance on governmental regulatory capacity. In either case, the
Malaysian experience recommends slow, painstaking development of institu-
tional capacity.
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[145] See, e.g., Regina v. MacMillan, [1968] 1 D.L.R. 2d 680 (matched order transactions).
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[151] Singapore Companies Act of 1970. § 132(A): see P.P. v. Choudhury. [19811 1 Malayan
LJ. 76 (prosecution under the Singapore Act).
[1521 Malaysian Securities Industry Act of 1983. § 89(4). For a detailed analysis of the
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Rev. 1283. 1297 (1966).
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
